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ABSTRACT 
 The convergence hypothesis is a popular tenet in modern discussions in macroeconomics 
and regional economics. It derives from the very fundamental properties of the neoclassical single-
sector growth model, and its assumption of diminishing returns to scale. Following this theoretical 
framework a number of empirical tests (σ or unconditional β or conditional β-convergence) has 
been developed. This paper tests unconditional and conditional β-convergence for the Greek 
economy. Three issues are being considered: (i)if there is regional convergence, (ii) if there is a 
North-Southern divide, (iii) if Greece is converging with the other economies taking part in the 
European integration project. Our empirical results reject the convergence hypothesis in all cases. 
These findings, together with similar findings for many other economies, pose significant problems 
for the theoretical assumptions of the neoclassical growth model with exogenous technical change. 
 
 
1. Introduction: theory and evidence 
 The convergence hypothesis is a popular tenet in modern discussions in macro and 
regional economics. It contends that there is a negative relationship  - after controlling for some set 
of variables - between initial income level and growth rate. Therefore, poor countries or regions 
tend to grow faster than developed ones and, subsequently, a convergence process is operating 
leading to similar levels of development. This hypothesis is derived, usually, from the very 
fundamental properties of the Solowian neoclassical single-sector growth model, and its typical 
assumptions of diminishing returns to capital, exogenous technological progress, full employment, 
a fixed relation between the labour force and population and exogenous growth of population. The 
neoclassical growth model for closed economies, as presented by Solow (1956), suggests that the 
per capita growth rates tend to be inversely related to the starting level of output or income per 
capita. Hence, if economies are similar with respect to preferences and technology, then poor 
economies grow faster than rich ones, promoting convergence in levels of per capita product and 
income. This thesis has been extended for the case of open economies. In the case of a closed 
economy convergence among its regions derives from (a) the diminishing returns to capital, (b) the 
mobility of capital and labour across regions and, (c) the gradual spread of technology. All these 
hypotheses can be easily justified on the basis of stylised facts for a single economy and for the 
long-run period1. The crucial assumption is the first, since it represents one of the very fundamental 
properties of the neoclassical growth model, whereas the others are being added as second grade 
- not necessary - assumptions. Because of the diminishing returns to capital - and given similar 
determinants of the steady state (capital accumulation rate, population growth rate, preferences 
etc.) - regions with a lower level of capital and output exhibit a greater rate of growth so as to catch 
up the more advanced regions (exhibiting smaller rates) and to converge to the steady state 
values. Put it simply, as capital accumulates its marginal product falls and so does the incentive to 
invest. Assuming capital mobility, capital flows to the less developed regions and the growth rate in 
the developed regions falls as the capital-labour ratio falls. The extension of the convergence 
hypothesis for different economies requires additional assumptions securing the open character of 
these economies. Therefore, the mobility of factors of production and the diffusion of technologies 
should be accounted for. This version of the convergence hypothesis has been branded by Baumol 
(1994) the “common forces” model. 
 The same convergence thesis has been advanced also within the context of the 
Technological Catching Up Hypothesis (Baumol (1986) or “contagion” model (Baumol (1994), i.e. 
that economies that are technologically backward may experience large jumps in productivity by 
adopting already-existing advanced technology. It should be noted that in this case the theoretical 
framework changes. Institutional (eg.education) and discrete technological (e.g. different 
technological policies) factors play a more significant role. Furthermore, Baumol (1986) recognises 
different clusters of countries and different results with regards to convergence (convergence clubs 
etc.)2. The three clusters of the industrialised, intermediate and centrally planned countries 
exhibited, for the period 1950-80, a convergence trend. However, the cluster of poorer less 
underdeveloped countries did not exhibited such a trend. Additionally, there has been little 
convergence among the groups. 
 The empirical procedures used to test the convergence hypothesis are almost the same for 
both the two beforementioned theoretical frameworks. Based on the Solowian single-sector growth 
model, three types of convergence have been recognized. 
 (1) Sigma convergence (σ-convergence) studies the cross section dispersion of per capita 
income (or productivity) levels. If the dispersion decreases over time, then per capita income levels 
tend to converge. This test has been criticised as crude and not conforming fully with the 
theoretical properties of the neoclassical growth model. 
 (2) Absolute beta convergence (β-convergence) is a cross section regression of time 
averaged growth rates on initial levels of per capita GDP. If there is a negative regression 
coefficient on the initial income level then a process of convergence is operating. This test takes 
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into account the initial levels of growth. However, it does not account fully for the determinants of 
the steady state. 
 (3) Finally, conditional β-convergence looks at the cross section regression coefficient of 
time averaged growth rates on initial incomes but also of a number of additional explanatory 
variables, such as the capital accumulation rate and the population growth rate. Conditional β-
convergence is considered a more appropriate test for the neoclassical growth model. 
 Following the formalisation introduced by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), in order to test for 
β-convergence the following non-linear regression is used:  
(1/Τ) (ln y0+T,i - ln y0,i) = c - (1/T) (1-e-βt) ln y0,i + e0+T,i                                                          (1) 
where ln y0+T,i - ln y0,i  is economy ‘s GDP per capita between 0 and T, ln y0,i  is the logarithm of 
economy ‘s GDP per capita at time 0, or the initial level of per capita GDP, t is a linear time trend 
and e0+T,i  is the disturbance term. 
 According to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), conditional β-convergence should be 
distinguished from absolute β-convergence. A set of economies displays conditional β-
convergence, if the partial correlation between growth and initial income is negative. In other 
words, if we run a cross-sectional regression of growth of initial income holding constant a number 
of additional variables, and we find that the coefficient of initial income level is positive, then the 
economies in the data display conditional β-convergence. If the coefficient of initial income is 
positive in a univariate regression -like regression (1)- then we say that the data set displays 
unconditional or absolute β-convergence. For conditional β-convergence, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1991) propose the estimation of the following regression: 
(1/T) (ln y0+t,i - lny0,i) = c - (1-e-βt) ln (y0i) + ψ Χit + e0+T,i                                                                    (2) 
where Χit   is a vector of variables that proxy for, and hold constant, the steady state. The only 
difference with (1), which tests for unconditional or absolute convergence, is the presence of the 
steady state vector Χit . 
 Although the neoclassical economic theory predicts convergence, the empirical evidence 
has been a subject for debate. Baumol (1986) was the first who examined and conclude in favour 
of convergence, De Long (1988) contradicted Baumol’s results, and after them a large body of 
literature appeared (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) etc.). 
 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) employ equation (2), which is in accordance with the 
neoclassical framework of analysis, in order to test empirically the existence or not of convergence. 
The overall evidence of their analysis weighs heavily in favor of convergence, suggesting that the 
results of the neoclassical growth models are valid. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) evidence, 
indicates that, when holding population growth and capital accumulation constant, countries 
converge about the rate the augmented Solow model predicts. Finally, other recent studies upon 
the subject of convergence support the theory of the neoclassical model (Coulombe and Lee 1995 
for the case of Canada and Cashin 1995 for Austalia) . 
 On the other hand, Mauro and Podrecca (1994) examined empirically the convergence 
hypothesis for the case of Italian regions. Their findings opposed those of Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1991). Also, Pagano (1993) studying productivity or income convergence in the European 
Community countries suggests that the process of convergence stops or even reverse with the oil 
shocks of 1970’s. Neven and Gouyete (1994) suggest that there exist dualism between Southern 
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and Northeastern regions of the European Community, and Button and Pentecost (1995) testing 
the convergence in the European Union regional economies find no significant convergence across 
those regions in the 1980’s. 
 
 
2. Issues of convergence in the economy of Greece 
 This paper tests unconditional and conditional β-convergence for the Greek economy. 
Three issues are being considered. Firstly, whether there is a regional convergence in the Greek 
economy. Secondly, given the interest in the possibility of a north-south divide in Greece, whether 
there is convergence between Southern and Northern Greece. Finally, whether the Greek economy 
is converging with the other European economies taking part in the European integration project. 
 The first issue is straightforward: it begs the question whether the Greek economy exhibits 
the properties and the results hypothesized by the neoclassical growth model. 
 The second issue refers to a nowadays popular debate in Greece. After the collapse of the 
Eastern block and the liberalisation of the other Balkan economies it has been voiced from many 
sides that there is a structural change in the Greek economy. Before, the South - mainly 
represented by the Athens area (the so-called economic and industrial polypus of Athens) - was 
the economic heartland of the country. The northern areas were basically dedicated to agriculture. 
Now - the argument maintains - after the crisis of the ‘70s the economic and industrial basis of the 
South has become aged and deindustrialisation (because of the crisis) is taking its toll. On the 
other hand, the northern areas - boosted also by opportunities in the newly-opened northern 
neighbouring countries - tend to become the new economic centre. 
 The third question considers the relationship with the European integration project. Greece 
takes part in that project with the expectation of converging with the more advanced Western 
European countries. This assumption - i.e. convergence of the European economies - has been 
supported by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991). However, all present day debates focus upon the real 
divergence among European economies. This fact has been contrasted to the Maastricht treaty 
requirements which emphasise nominal convergence. The problem is more grave since the EEC - 
and now the EU - has created specific funds in order to support the less developed mostly 
Southern European countries to improve their infrastructure and productive basis. These resources 
did not represent a significant amount in European terms - and after all the EEC’s budget is 
extremely limited - but they do represent significant resources in terms of the particular targeted 
economies. Greece has received from European Union resources equivalent to 5% of the GDP 
over 6 years (Community Support Framework I) and funds equivalent to 6%-7% of the Gross 
Regional Product (Integrated Mediterranean Programmes). It is also estimated that the second 
Community Support Framework will contribute resources equivalent to 5%-6% of the annual Greek 
GDP over 6 years (1994-1996). However, these resources seem to fail to produce the expected 
outcome. So, the second issue refers to the convergence or divergence of Greece with the other 
European economies. 
 
 
3. Empirical Results 
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 In our empirical analysis we estimate regressions (1), (2) to test for the different types of β-
convergence across the Greek regions. 
 
4.1 Testing for unconditional β-convergence 
 As a first step, we investigate whether there exist “Barro and Sala-i-Martin type” of 
unconditional β-convergence across Greek regions. For this purpose we estimate empirically, using 
the technique of non-linear least squares, the (1) regression (Table 1). We estimated this 
regression for the sub periods before the entrance of Greece in the European Community (EC),  
after the entrance of Greece in the EC, and for the whole period.  
      [TABLE 1] 
 The  β coefficient, although is positive, is never statistically significant different from zero. 
In the same table we present the results of the estimation of the same basic equation (1) with the 
addition of two explanatory variables, the shares of GDP in the manufacturing and industrial sector 
for each region (meti and indi respectively). These two explanatory variables are used on the 
grounds that this should help to stabilize the β coefficient across the different sub-periods, by 
holding constant the shocks which might affect groups of regions in common, or those correlated 
with initial per capita income. In our estimation the inclusion of these additional variables does not  
improve our estimates and thus does not appear to play a significant role. 
 Looking for a possible north-south divide, we estimate again regression (1), this time 
including an additional North/South dummy variable (N/S) on the right hand side. This dummy 
variable takes the values of 1 for Southern regions and 0 for Northern regions as a proxy for 
different steady state values of per capita income between North and South. Thus, a positive 
estimate of the β coefficient in this case would indicate that there exist β-convergence within each 
area, rather than convergence across all Greek regions of convergence between North and South 
(Table 2). 
      [TABLE 2] 
 The estimates show little improvement with respect to the previous results, even if we add 
structural variables as before. The results are not conclusive because we do not have statistically 
significant estimates for the coefficient of convergence as the values of t-statistics reveals. Thus, 
the hypothesis of absolute β-convergence across Greek regions is clearly rejected. 
 
4.2 Testing for conditional β-convergence. 
 The poor statistical performance of the previous statistical regressions (tables 1 and 2) 
might be due to the fact that we have not explicitly controlled for the cross-regional variations of the 
steady states towards which each region is supposed to converge. In other words we have not 
tested for conditional β-convergence. 
 The concept of conditional β-convergence, suggests the estimation of a multiple regression 
like (2). In our empirical analysis as steady state proxy variable we initially use the share of 
investment on GDP, which is the most important factor that can lead the Greek regions to 
convergence (Tables 3,4) 
     [TABLE  3, 4] 
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 The coefficient of convergence β is always positive as the neoclassical theory predicts but 
it is never significantly different from zero, with the exception of the last case and specifically for the 
period after the introduction of Greece in the EC (1981-1996). The latter result implies conditional 
convergence within the Northern and the Southern part of Greece separately, supporting the 
popular view prevailing in Greece about the divergence between North and South. Thus, our 
results do not support the predictions of the neoclassical growth model. Finally, maybe the most 
important thing is that the coefficient of the share of investment on GDP is negative, probably 
implying ineffective investment planning for Greece.   
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 The present paper examines the issue of convergence across Greek regions, following the 
theoretical basis of the neoclassical model of economic growth. Our empirical results are not in 
accordance with the neoclassical model. In all three issues under examination the hypotheses of 
the model are being negated. This rejection has both theoretical and empirical connotations. We 
contend that it is the model - and the theory underlying it - that cannot grasp reality. 
 On the theoretical aspect, both the “common forces” and the “contagion” model set out to 
verify a theoretically presupposed convergence. This is stronger in the case of the first model - 
deriving from the constitutive properties of the neoclassical growth model. These properties have 
been rightly criticised as erroneous. The Cambridge, UK critique (Garegnani (1970) etc.) has 
proved that the neoclassical theory of distribution, and thereby the aggregate production function, 
are invalid3. Consequently, the use of the latter in studying convergence brings potential bias to the 
analysis. Additionally, the diminishing returns to capital assumption has been also criticised as 
invalid. In the case of the “contagion” model the same theoretical criticisms apply. 
 Regarding the empirical reality, both models fail to explain why a vast number of countries 
fail to not only converge but even to follow the more developed ones. This failure is less forceful in 
the case of the “contagion” model since it can accept the existence of such a host - or hosts - of 
countries; but it cannot explain why. So absolute convergence is contradicted by the failure of 
poorer countries (and regions) to converge. But even conditional convergence does not always 
occur, since it comes about within some, but not all “clubs” of countries (Baumol, 1986). 
Additionally, even when convergence applies, it holds for some periods and not for others. Finally,  
the convergence theory cannot explain why the productivity ranking of the follower countries has 
changed over time even when they converge toward the productivity level of the leader. 
 All these point out to the fundamental limitations of both convergence models. In the case 
of the typical Solovian model the assumption of non-interdependence between advanced and 
backward economies lead to treat them as being driven by the same common forces towards a 
common steady state. The rate of growth of the former appear not to affect the latter. Moreover, 
trade relations, obstacles to the technological innovation and world economic hierarchies are 
absent making the model extremely unrealistic. Finally the exogeneity of technical progress is a 
well known deficiency of this theory. 
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 In the case of the contagion model the unrealistic assumption of common forces (in the 
form of common technology) is dropped. In advanced countries growth is led by technological 
innovation, whereas in backward countries it is led by imitation. Convergence depends upon the 
rate of technological transfer from advanced to backward countries. However, contrary to the 
theory, convergence is not a certainty but a potentiality. As Abramovitz (1994) admits, the 
existence of a process of convergence is not automatic but depends upon social capabilities 
(factors limiting the diffusion of knowledge, rate of structural change, institutional forms etc.). 
Despite its greater sophistication, the contagion model fails to incorporate properly all these factors. 
 Last, but not the least, the convergence thesis cannot address the concerns of policy-
makers interested in regional development. Traditional cross-section regressions on the 
convergence equation cannot solve issues such as that of the nature of interactions between 
different countries (regions). Or, if currently leading economies are always the first to innovate 
technologically and whether new technology filters passively to poorer economies. Also, it fails to 
understand agglomeration processes and the institutional and transactions costs’ dimension of 
regional development. 
 The abovementioned theoretical limitations of the convergence thesis are verified by the 
particular characteristics of the Greek economy. Neither the common forces nor the contagion 
mechanism seem to operate. Economic activity was unevenly distributed throughout the post-
WW.II era, being primarily concentrated in the prefectures of Athens and Piraeus, and to a lesser 
extent Thessaloniki (Kottis (1980)). This is verified by the strong urbanisation trends that began in 
the 1950s and continue to exist. Furthermore, it is telling that there is no convergence neither in 
periods of robust development (1960-73) nor in periods of recession (1973-1996) and despite 
significant sectoral transformations of the economic structure. Developed regions seems to offer 
undeniable advantages with regard to infrastructure. Another well-documented reason is state’s 
infamous overcentralisation. Economic activities closer to the seat of government enjoyed better 
relations with the state machine. Additionally, regional policies towards a more even spatial 
distribution of economic activities proved to be ineffective. Their incentives system was 
characterised by innate weaknesses and contradictions (related to vested interests)4. 
 The same considerations hold for the two main developmental poles of the Greek 
economy, Southern and Northern Greece. Despite recent developments and the increased 
economic significance of Northern Greece, the Southern area exhibits a more or less steady lead, 
since it represents those regions that were developed first and foremost the Athens area. On the 
other hand aspirations for a more ambitious role for Northern Greece (and particularly the 
Thessaloniki area), because of the opening of the Balkan economies have not been vindicated. 
 Historical evidence shows that in economies, instead of convergence, divergence and 
stratification reigns. The issue of both cross-national and regional convergence or divergence can 
be studied more properly from the premises of an “uneven development” model. Such an approach 
should incorporate the historical and social dimension and could explain patterns of development 
both within the Greek economy as well as between Greece and the other European countries. 
Within this perspective technical change should be theorised as endogenous and subject to - but 
also a means of - competition. This field is open for future research. 
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 6. Suggestions for future research 
 Having presented the theoretical and methodological critique of the convergence 
hypothesis, there is still room for further testing it in future research. The definitions of Bernard and 
Durlauf (1995) lead naturally to the use of cointegration techniques in testing this hypothesis. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to compare our present results with those derived from the use of 
time series. Moreover, since the division of Greece in regions is merely administrative, it might be 
useful to test the convergence hypothesis in relation to the prefectures of the country. 
 
ENDNOTES 
1. For example, there is an extensive literature - not only in heterodox (institutionalist etc.) 
traditions about the segmentation of labour markets, local labour markets and, hence, a relative 
immobility of labour. However, in the longer long-run - and from the premises of a single-sector 
model (i.e. not accounting for different types of capital and labour) - it can be assumed that any 
such immobility can be smoothed down. 
2. Baumol’s concept of b-convergence has been criticised (see Romer (1986, 1989) for 
depending heavily upon the particular sample used and, thus, holding only for group of economies 
with similar steady state determinants. 
3.  The neoclassical model is inconsistent because it neglects the interdependence of income 
distribution and the value of the capital stock. In this model the value of the capital stock cannot be 
known until the profit rate is known, but the profit rate (equal to the marginal product of capital) is 
unknowable without knowing the value of the (aggregate) capital stock. It has been shown that 
because of this circularity, the aggregate production function is valid only in a one-commodity world 
or when the capital-labour ratios and technologies are equal in all sectors. 
4. For a detailed analysis, with emphasis on industry, see Labrianidis-Papamichos (1990). 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Testing for Conditional Convergence  
Model : (1/Τ) (ln y0+T,i - ln y0,i) = c - (1/T) (1-e-βt) ln y0,i + e0+T,i 
  
 Basic Equation Basic Equation with Structural Variables   
period β R2 β met ind R2 
1971 
1981 
0,0006 
(0,8) 
0,05 0,0002 
(0,5) 
-0,02 
(-2,8) 
0,001 
(0,09) 
0,51 
1981 
1996 
0,0006 
(0,5) 
0,02 0,001 
(1,3) 
-0,02 
(-4,6) 
-0,02 
(-3,7) 
0,76 
1971 
1996 
0,001 
(0,7) 
0,05 0,001 
(0,8) 
-0,04 
(-3,18) 
-0,02 
(-1,12) 
0,55 
 
 
 
Table 2 : Testing for Conditional Convergence with N/S dummy 
Model : (1/Τ) (ln y0+T,i - ln y0,i) = c - (1/T) (1-e-βt) ln y0,i + e0+T,i 
 Basic Equation Basic Equation with Structural Variables 
period β N/S R2 β met ind N/S R2 
1971 
1981 
-0,0006 
(-0,4) 
0,009 
(0,9) 
0,12 0,0002 
(0,19) 
-0,02 
(-3,57) 
-0,02 
(-3,4) 
0,00 
(0,00) 
0,76 
1981 
1996 
-0,002 
(-0,9) 
0,02 
(1,35) 
0,17 0,001 
(0,54) 
-0,02 
(-2,28) 
0,001 
(0,09) 
0,00 
(0,00) 
0,51 
1971 
1996 
-0,003 
(-0,92) 
0,02 
(1,45) 
0,21 0,0007 
(0,18) 
-0,04 
(-2,3) 
-0,02 
(-1,0) 
0,003 
(0,14) 
0,55 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 : Testing for Conditional Convergence 
Model : (1/T) (ln y0+t,i - lny0,i) = c - (1-e-βt) ln (y0i) + ψ Χit + e0+T,i                                                          
 Basic Equation Basic Equation with Structural Variables 
period β si R2 β si met ind R2 
1971 
1981 
0,0007 
(0,82) 
-0,0002 
(-0,6) 
0,09 0,0002 
(0,41) 
-0,001 
(-0,41) 
-0,01 
(-2,9) 
-0,02 
(-3,0) 
0,76 
1981 
1996 
0,0008 
(0,86) 
-0,001 
(-2,8) 
0,46 0,0009 
(0,96) 
-0,008 
(-1,63) 
-0,01 
(-1,7) 
-0,01 
(-0,7) 
063 
1971 
1996 
0,001 
(1,08) 
-0,001 
(-2,1) 
0,35 0,0006 
(0,48) 
-0,001 
(-1,8) 
-0,02 
(-1,3) 
0,046 
(-2,1) 
0,68 
 
 
 
Table 4: Testing for Conditional Convergence with N/S dummy 
Model : (1/T) (ln y0+t,i - lny0,i) = c - (1-e-βt) ln (y0i) + ψ Χit + e0+T,i                                                          
Basic Equation with Structural Variables with N/S dummy 
 10
 11
period β si met ind N/S R2 
1971 
1981 
0,0005 
(0,35) 
-0,0002 
(-0,49) 
-0,01 
(-2,7) 
-0,02 
(-2,8) 
-0,002 
(-0,2) 
0,77 
1981 
1996 
0,004  
(1,65) 
-0,001 
(-2,22) 
-0,01 
(-2,14 
-0,01 
(-1,18) 
-0,022 
(-1,41) 
063 
1971 
1996 
0,0033 
(0,91) 
-0,001 
(-1,9) 
-0,02 
(-1,4) 
0,048 
(-2,1) 
-0,017 
(-0,8) 
0,68 
 
 
 
